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WHO MUST TESTIFY?: 
THE LIMITS OF THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE WHEN IT IS APPLIED TO 
FORENSIC LABORATORY REPORTS 
Andrew Arons* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees, inter alia, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”
1
 When interpreting this provision, which has been 
deemed the “Confrontation Clause,”
2
 the U.S. Supreme Court 
observed that “a primary interest secured by [the provision] is the 
right of cross-examination.”
3
 In Ohio v. Roberts,
4
 the Court 
summarized its long-standing approach to addressing whether and to 
what extent the Confrontation Clause guaranteed a criminal 
defendant the right to cross-examine individuals who made out-of-
court statements.
5
 Roberts held that such statements were 
constitutionally admissible absent cross-examination so long as the 
declarant was “unavailable” and the statement “b[ore] adequate 
‘indicia of reliability.’”
6
 
The Court reversed course in Crawford v. Washington.
7
 There, 
Justice Antonin Scalia led a six-Justice majority in holding that, 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S., Business 
Administration, June 2010, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona. I want to extend my 
thanks to Professor Justin Levitt for his invaluable assistance with this Comment. I also thank 
Marty Koresawa and Allen Haroutounian. Lastly, I am grateful for the support that my friends 
and family have provided for me during three long and arduous years of law school. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. E.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1152 (2011). 
 3. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965). 
 4. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 5. As is the case in the Federal Rules of Evidence, this Comment refers to such individuals 
as “declarants.” See FED. R. EVID. 801. 
 6. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 7. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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absent the in-court testimony of the declarant,
8
 the Confrontation 
Clause prohibits the prosecution from introducing out-of-court 
“testimonial statements”
9
 unless the declarant is unavailable to testify 
in court and the criminal defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine that person.
10
 The Court reasoned that, in drafting the Sixth 
Amendment, the Framers intended to have the right to cross-examine 
the declarant be a necessary, and not merely a sufficient, means of 
testing the out-of-court statement’s reliability.
11
 
Five years later, in the 5−4 decision of Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts,
12
 the Court expanded Crawford’s scope by holding 
that reports prepared by forensic laboratories are “testimonial 
statements.”
13
 Thus, absent a showing that those involved in the 
report’s production were unavailable and that the defendant “had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine them,” the Confrontation Clause 
required “the analysts” to testify.
14
 The dissenters raised a slew of 
arguments, including that the Court’s holding failed to clearly state 
which analysts need to testify to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, 
that it imposed high costs on the government by requiring the 
prosecution to call forensic analysts every time it offers forensic 
laboratory reports, and that it created a rule that was unnecessary 
given the reliability of such reports.
15
 
Three years later in Williams v. Illinois,
16
 a fractured Court
17
 
heard another case involving the Confrontation Clause’s application 
 
 8. The Court concluded that a declarant of an out-of-court statement is a “witness” for the 
purposes of the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 51. 
 9. The Court later defined “testimonial statements” as out-of-court statements that have the 
“primary purpose” of “establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). This Comment would not alter 
Davis’s definition of “testimonial” because restricting the protections of the Confrontation Clause 
to only statements (e.g., forensic reports) that are “certified” and “sworn to” would improperly 
value form over substance. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2275−77 (2012) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 10. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37, 53−54. 
 11. Id. at 55−56, 61. 
 12. 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 13. See id. at 306, 310−11. 
 14. Id. at 311. 
 15. See id. at 343 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen 
Breyer and Samuel Alito joined Justice Anthony Kennedy’s dissenting opinion. Id. at 330. The 
Court later reiterated that forensic laboratory reports are testimonial. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 
131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709−10 (2011). 
 16. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
 17. Id. at 2227. 
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to forensic laboratory reports.
18
 The plurality, which consisted of the 
four justices who dissented in Melendez-Diaz,
19
 concluded that the 
prosecution’s introduction of a laboratory report in Williams did not 
violate the Confrontation Clause.
20
 
Just as the dissenters in Melendez-Diaz were concerned about 
the Court’s imprecise application of the Confrontation Clause to 
forensic laboratory reports,
21
 so too was Justice Breyer in Williams. 
In his concurring opinion, he emphasized that Melendez-Diaz 
provides “no logical stopping place” with regard to the number of 
witnesses who need to be called.
22
 Noting that as many as six 
analysts can work on a particular DNA profile,
23
 Justice Breyer was 
apprehensive that the prosecution would need to call all of them to 
satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
24
 
Because of this perceived problem, he posed the following 
question: “Who should the prosecution have . . . to call to testify” 
when it offers a forensic laboratory report against a criminal 
defendant?
25
 Answering this question is of immense importance 
because judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys need to know 
how to constitutionally try their cases.
26
 And despite the fact that 
Williams is now the third time in three years that the Supreme Court 
has applied the Confrontation Clause in the context of laboratory 
reports,
27
 the answer is no clearer. Moreover, although the plurality 
did not expressly state a concern that Melendez-Diaz’s imprecise 
application would impose high costs on the government, it is fair to 
assume that such concern played a role, since the plurality strained 
its analysis to conclude that there was no Confrontation Clause 
violation.
28
 Consequently, this Comment strives to answer Justice 
Breyer’s question. 
 
 18. Id. (plurality opinion). 
 19. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 306. 
 20. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion). 
 21. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 343 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 22. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2246 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 23. Id. at 2252−55. 
 24. See id. at 2247. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 2248. 
 27. Two years before Williams, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause should apply to 
laboratory reports. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310−11 (2009). One year 
before Williams, the Court again reached the same conclusion. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 
S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011). 
 28. See infra Part III.A. 
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Part II of this Comment presents the facts and procedural history 
of Williams v. Illinois. Part III describes how a fractured Court 
attempted to resolve the Confrontation Clause issue in the case. Part 
IV proposes an answer to Justice Breyer’s question, which animated 
the controversy in both Williams and its precursors: when the 
prosecution offers a forensic laboratory report against a criminal 
defendant, the Confrontation Clause requires the prosecution to (1) 
call all of the analysts who tested the evidence at issue or (2) call a 
supervisor
29
 who authored the laboratory report and witnessed all 
stages of the testing of the evidence either firsthand or by watching a 
videotape (or like medium) that recorded the actual testing.
30
 This 
approach is consistent with Crawford’s principles
31
 and effectuates 
the objective of reliability without unduly burdening the 
government.
32
 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 10, 2000, a young woman (designated by the 
initials “L.J.”) was raped in Chicago, Illinois.
33
 After she reported the 
crime, the police took swabs of semen found in her vagina.
34
 
Defendant Sandy Williams was not a suspect at that time.
35
 The 
police then sent the samples to Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory 
(“Cellmark”) for testing, and Cellmark sent back a report that 
described a male DNA profile.
36
 Although two “reviewers” signed 
the report, they did not certify or formally swear to its contents.
37
 
 
 29. As a shorthand, this Comment will refer to the supervisor defined here as a “supervisor 
with personal knowledge.” Such supervisors presumably have the expertise to meaningfully 
evaluate the results of each stage of the testing. 
 30. The prosecution would have to comply with this rule unless all of the appropriate 
declarants are unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them. The 
appropriate declarants would be all of the analysts unless a supervisor observed the testing and 
authored the report. 
 31. Because it is consistent with Crawford, this proposal permits the defendant an 
opportunity for meaningful cross-examination. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 
(2004) (holding that the Confrontation Clause requires that the reliability of evidence “be 
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination”). 
 32. As discussed in Part IV.A, in the event that any other person makes a “testimonial” 
statement that is relied upon in the laboratory report offered by the prosecution, the prosecution 
would need to call that individual to the stand in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 
 33. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2229 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
  
Winter 2013] WHO MUST TESTIFY? 725 
On August 3, 2000, the police drew Williams’s blood after he 
had been arrested on charges unrelated to the L.J. rape.
38
 A state 
forensic laboratory tested the blood and prepared a DNA profile that 
was stored in an electronic database.
39
 Later, Sandra Lambatos, a 
forensic technician at a state police laboratory, checked the electronic 
database to see if any DNA profiles matched the one provided in the 
Cellmark report.
40
 The computer indicated that the DNA profile of 
Williams’s blood matched the DNA profile prepared by Cellmark.
41
 
After L.J. identified Williams as her attacker in a lineup 
conducted on April 17, 2001, he was formally indicted for her rape.
42
 
During Williams’s bench trial in 2006, the prosecution called a state 
laboratory forensic scientist who had verified the presence of semen 
on the swabs before they were purportedly sent off to Cellmark.
43
 
The prosecution also called the state analyst who had developed the 
DNA profile from Williams’s blood.
44
 The state did not call any 
employee from Cellmark.
45
 
After the two other analysts testified, the prosecution called 
Lambatos to the stand.
46
 The prosecutor asked her: “Was there a 
computer match generated of the male DNA profile found in semen 
from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.] to a male DNA profile that had been 
identified as having originated from Sandy Williams?”
47
 Over an 
objection from the defense, Lambatos answered in the affirmative.
48
 
The prosecution next asked Lambatos if she had compared the two 
DNA profiles and concluded that they matched.
49
 She answered in 
the affirmative to both of those questions.
50
 
The defense moved to exclude Lambatos’s testimony regarding 
the Cellmark DNA profile on Confrontation Clause grounds because 
 
 38. Id. at 2229 (plurality opinion). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 2230. 
 46. Id. at 2229. 
 47. Id. at 2267 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 48. Id. at 2230 (plurality opinion). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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no analyst from Cellmark had testified.
51
 The prosecution responded 
that Lambatos’s testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause 
because under the Illinois Rules of Evidence, experts are allowed to 
rely on facts of which they do not have personal knowledge to 
explain the basis of their opinions.
52
 The trial judge denied the 
motion and later found Williams guilty.
53
 
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed in relevant part on the 
basis that, under state law, the report was offered merely to provide a 
foundation for Lambatos’s expert opinion (i.e., that the two DNA 
profiles matched) and not for its truth (i.e., the Cellmark profile and 
its accurateness).
54
 The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed for the 
same reasons.
55
 After granting certiorari on the issue of whether 
Lambatos’s testimony concerning the Cellmark report violated the 
Confrontation Clause, a divided U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgment.
56
 
III.  THE FRACTURED COURT’S ATTEMPT 
TO RESOLVE WILLIAMS 
The Court issued four different opinions in Williams.
57
 Justice 
Alito authored a plurality opinion, which Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined. Justice Kagan wrote a dissent, 
joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. Justice Breyer 
wrote a separate concurrence, and Justice Thomas concurred only in 
the judgment.
58
 
A.  The Plurality Opinion 
The plurality, led by Justice Samuel Alito, concluded that the 
Confrontation Clause did not bar the state analyst from testifying 
about Cellmark’s DNA profile.
59
 Justice Alito reasoned that this 
evidence was not being offered for its truth but, instead, merely to 
explain the basis of the expert’s opinion that there had been a DNA 
 
 51. Id. at 2231. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. at 2231−32. 
 56. See id. at 2227−28, 2232. 
 57. Id. at 2221. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 2227–28. 
  
Winter 2013] WHO MUST TESTIFY? 727 
match between the defendant’s blood and (whatever) DNA sample 
was in Cellmark’s possession.
60
 According to the plurality, testifying 
that the blood DNA profile matched the profile from the semen was 
no different from expert testimony that a particular configuration of 
the DNA profile produced from the semen would have matched the 
DNA profile from Williams’s blood.
61
 Because Crawford held that 
statements that are not offered for their truth are not “testimonial,”
62
 
the plurality concluded that Lambatos’s testimony about the 
Cellmark report did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
63
 
Further, as an independent basis of the plurality’s conclusion 
that the report was not “testimonial,” Justice Alito determined that 
Cellmark’s report was not generated for the “primary purpose of 
accusing a targeted individual.” He arrived at this conclusion because 
the police did not know that Williams was a suspect at the time the 
sample was being tested or that the DNA profile would inculpate 
Williams.
64
 Rather, Justice Alito concluded that the report’s “primary 
purpose was to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large[,]”
65
 
thus diminishing the “prospect of fabrication . . . .”
66
 The plurality 
concluded that this “primary purpose of accusing a targeted 
individual” test was appropriate based on its interpretation of the 
facts of Crawford and its progeny.
67
 
B.  Justice Breyer’s Concurrence 
Although Justice Stephen Breyer joined the plurality opinion, he 
would have rather set the case for reargument.
68
 He wanted the 
parties to help the Court decide who should testify if the prosecution 
introduces a forensic laboratory report.
69
 Concerned about the cost 
implications for the government, Justice Breyer pointed out that 
under the Court’s precedent, all of the analysts who test a forensic 
 
 60. Id. at 2236, 2238. 
 61. See id. at 2238. 
 62. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59−60 n.9 (2004). 
 63. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2238−40 (plurality opinion). 
 64. Id. at 2243–44. 
 65. Id. at 2243. 
 66. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 67. Id. at 2242–43. Justice Alito went on to say that laboratory analysts are generally neutral 
and probably do not fabricate forensic results. Id. at 2244. This conclusion appears to contradict 
Melendez-Diaz’s rationale. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009). 
 68. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2245 (Breyer, J., concurring).
 
 69. Id. at 2247. 
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sample may have to testify because analysts “regularly rely on the 
technical statements and results of other [analysts] to form their own 
opinions.”
70
 In the absence of reargument on this issue, Justice 
Breyer relied on the dissenting opinions in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
71
 to conclude that laboratory reports were 
not testimonial.
72
 
C.  Justice Thomas’s Concurrence 
in the Judgment 
Although Justice Clarence Thomas concluded that Lambatos’s 
testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause, he refused to 
adopt the plurality’s reasoning because he concluded that testimony 
offered to explain the basis of an expert’s testimony is always 
offered for its truth.
73
 This is because if the underlying facts are not 
true, the expert’s opinion is irrelevant.
74
 Moreover, Justice Thomas 
concluded that the plurality’s “primary purpose test” was flawed 
because it “lack[ed] any grounding in constitutional text, in history, 
or in logic.”
75
 
However, Justice Thomas still concluded that Cellmark’s report 
was not testimonial because its authors had neither certified nor 
sworn to it. Thus, it did not have sufficient “‘indicia of solemnity.’”
76
 
He stated that the solemnity rule would not allow prosecutors to 
circumvent the Confrontation Clause because its scope “reaches the 
use of technically informal statements when used to evade the 
formalized process.”
77
 
 
 70. Id. at 2246. 
 71. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 72. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2248 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 73. See id. at 2255, 2257 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 74. See id. at 2257 & n.1.
 
 75. Id. at 2261–62. 
 76. Id. at 2259−60 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 837 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 77. Id. at 2260 n.5 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 838 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The legal effect of Justice Thomas’s 
conclusion regarding whether a statement is “testimonial” is unclear because the plurality’s and 
Justice Thomas’s opinions rest on “two essentially distinct rationales.” See Linda Novak, The 
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 763–67 
(1980). 
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D.  The Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the dissent, would have held 
that the analyst’s testimony concerning Cellmark’s report violated 
the Confrontation Clause.
78
 She agreed with Justice Thomas that the 
report was offered for its truth because  “the factfinder must assess 
the truth of the out-of-court statement—i.e., Cellmark’s DNA profile 
was produced from the semen found in L.J. and was accurate—in 
order “to determine the validity of the [testifying analyst’s] 
conclusion” that the semen profile matched the defendant’s blood 
profile.
79
 Justice Kagan also concluded that the plurality’s new 
“primary purpose” test was flawed for essentially the same reasons 
that Justice Thomas rejected it.
80
 
However, she refused to adopt Justice Thomas’s definition of 
“testimonial” because she believed that it would “grant[] 
constitutional significance to minutia.”
81
 Moreover, Justice Kagan 
did not believe that Justice Thomas’s evasion test would prevent 
prosecutors from circumventing the Confrontation Clause (by using 
laboratory reports that are not certified or sworn to, for example) 
because he did not explain how the test was workable.
82
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A majority of the Court (both Justice Thomas and the dissent) 
subscribes to the belief that the Confrontation Clause’s purpose is to 
test the reliability of testimonial statements through cross-
examination.
83
 Conversely, the plurality seems to believe that the 
Clause’s purpose is to ensure the reliability of testimony so long as 
doing so does not impose unreasonably high costs on the 
government, and that cross-examination is not the sole method of 
constitutionally ensuring reliability.
84
 Therefore, there is one key 
issue that separates the two camps: Who, if anyone, has to be 
available for cross-examination when the prosecution introduces a 
 
 78. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 2268–69. 
 80. See id. at 2272–73. 
 81. Id. at 2275–76. 
 82. See id. at 2276 n.7. 
 83. See id. at 2259 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)); id. at 2266 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Melendez-Diaz 
v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 317 (2009)).
 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 2227, 2239 (plurality opinion). 
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forensic report? This Comment argues that the prosecution should be 
required to call either all of the analysts who analyzed the sample or 
a supervisor with personal knowledge. Such an approach effectuates 
both camps’ purposes because it is consistent with Crawford’s 
principles and effectuates the goal of reliability without unduly 
burdening the government. 
A.  Calling All of the Analysts 
Is Generally Mandated by Crawford’s Principles 
Crawford and its progeny have announced certain doctrinal 
principles intended to safeguard a defendant’s right to cross-examine 
witnesses. Crawford held that unless the declarant is unavailable and 
the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him or her, 
“testimonial statements” are admissible only if the prosecution calls 
the declarant to the stand at trial.
85
 Two years later, Davis v. 
Washington
86
 further defined “testimonial statements” as those that 
have the “primary purpose” of “establish[ing] or prov[ing] past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”
87
 This 
Comment’s proposal is consistent with these principles. 
Producing all of the analysts that test a relevant piece of forensic 
evidence is ordinarily mandated by Crawford’s requirement that 
declarants be subject to cross-examination.
88
 As Justice Breyer 
pointed out, when a particular forensic sample works its way through 
the testing process, the analysts “regularly rely on the technical 
statements and results of other [analysts] to form their own 
opinions,” thus rendering the final laboratory report the culmination 
of “layer upon layer of technical statements (express or implied) 
made by one expert and relied upon by another.”
89
 Because, in the 
absence of a supervisor with personal knowledge, the final laboratory 
report is really a collection of testimonial statements—i.e., each 
analyst explicitly or implicitly communicates the results of a 
particular part of a procedure that are in turn used to establish the 
 
 85. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54. 
 86. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 87. Id. at 822.
 
 88. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54. 
 89. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2246 (Breyer, J., concurring). For instance, in a typical DNA test, 
the technicians who subject the DNA to electrophoresis (so as to get a visual depiction of the 
genetic material) rely on the assumption that another analyst had properly amplified the DNA 
earlier. See id. at 2252−55. 
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guilt of the defendant—all of the analysts in the chain of testing 
would need to testify to satisfy Crawford. Having them all testify 
would allow the defendant to point out whether an analyst 
erroneously or disingenuously performed any of the testing stages. 
Justice Kennedy believes that Crawford’s application to forensic 
testing is more expansive because it could require the prosecution to 
call individuals who calibrate the machines that analysts use.
90
 His 
conclusion is incorrect because although analysts may rely on these 
statements in arriving at their final results, the calibrators probably 
do not primarily intend for their statements to be used in a trial 
against the accused. This is not only because a calibrator may be an 
independent contractor hired specifically to perform that task,
91
 but 
also because such calibrations are ordinarily not made for particular 
criminal cases.
92
 Rather, the laboratory analysts who handle the 
sample or a supervisor with personal knowledge tend to be the only 
individuals during the testing of the forensic evidence who make 
testimonial statements.
93
 Because calibrators do not typically respond 
to requests from law enforcement officials regarding particular cases, 
they have less of an incentive to falsify results or to forsake acting 
with due care.
94
 
B.  Effectuating the Goal of Reliability 
Without Unduly Burdening the Government 
This section describes ways to accommodate the constitutional 
command that not only yield the benefit of reliability but also avoid 
imposing substantial costs on state and federal governments. 
 
 90. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 332–33 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 91. See id. at 332. 
 92. See id. at 311 n.1 (majority opinion); see, e.g., 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. 
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 23.03[b] (2011) (explaining that some instruments used 
for a type of drug testing require “daily or weekly adjustments”). 
 93. See, e.g., Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2252–55 (Breyer, J., concurring) (summarizing with a 
diagram a typical DNA test in which only analysts work on the DNA sample). 
 94. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318. Personnel in the shipping department of the 
laboratory may make testimonial statements relied upon by analysts because such employees 
record the receipt of evidence relevant to particular criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. 
Jones, 356 F.3d 529, 535−36 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that a form pertaining to particular evidence 
“indicated that the bag had been received on [a particular date], with its seal unbroken”). 
Consequently, the Court may conclude that such individuals have the incentive to falsify those 
records or to manage them negligently. 
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1. Benefits of Cross-Examination 
of Forensic Analysts 
The Justices who joined the plurality opinion have claimed that 
the Constitution does not mandate that forensic analysts be cross-
examined as a condition to a laboratory report’s admission, in part 
because there is no perceptible benefit to such a requirement.
95
 
However, cross-examination does have value in this context because 
it allows defendants to show the fact-finder that an analyst lied or 
made a mistake. For instance, the dissent in Williams cited a 
California case in which Cellmark had mistakenly switched the 
defendant’s and victim’s DNA samples in a rape case; the report thus 
erroneously concluded that DNA on the victim’s sweater matched 
the defendant’s DNA.
96
 Although the error was revealed on redirect 
examination of an analyst,
97
 the mistake was a perfect candidate for 
cross-examination because the defendant had discovered the grounds 
on which he could challenge the validity of the report
98
 and could 
have addressed it by questioning the witness. And had the expert not 
been required to testify as to the error, it would have been more 
difficult for the defense to challenge the report’s accuracy.
99
 
Therefore, cross-examination can only help ensure that forensic 
evidence is reliable. 
2.  The Costs and the Measures 
that Minimize Them 
a.  The costs 
The members of the Williams plurality claimed that it is too 
costly to require the government to call forensic analysts to introduce 
the forensic reports. That is because doing so would require analysts 
 
 95. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 338–40, 343 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 96. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2264−65 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Reporter's Partial 
Transcript at 3−4, People v. Kocak, No. SCD110465 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1995), available at 
http://www.nlada.org/forensics/for_lib/Documents/1037341561.0/JohnIvanKocak.pdf). 
 97. Reporter's Partial Transcript, supra note 96, at 2. 
 98. William C. Thompson, DNA Evidence in the O.J. Simpson Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 
827, 845 (1996). 
 99. The plurality contended that the defendant’s right to subpoena a state forensic analyst is 
an adequate safeguard for reliability. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion); id. at 
2251−52 (Breyer, J., concurring). However, holding that the analyst’s testimony is not a condition 
of the report’s admissibility would make it more difficult for the defendant to challenge the 
validity of the report if the declarant refuses to testify or is otherwise unavailable. See Melendez-
Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324. 
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to leave their posts and courts to accommodate scheduling 
conflicts.
100
 The plurality asserted that these costs would cause 
prosecutors to rely on less reliable evidence, like eyewitness 
testimony.
101
 However, as Justice Scalia noted, the cost assumptions 
relied upon by the members of the plurality are founded on the 
unsupported assumptions that, in all unsettled criminal cases, no 
defendant will ever stipulate to a report’s findings and every 
defendant will object to the evidence and therefore demand that the 
appropriate analyst appear to testify
102
 Furthermore, there are 
measures available to jurisdictions that can help them ameliorate 
costs incurred. 
b.  Measure #1: 
Consolidation 
One measure is to reduce the number of analysts who work on 
forensic samples. Doing so would lessen the burden on the 
government because the Confrontation Clause would require fewer 
analysts to be taken away from their posts, and the courts would need 
to accommodate fewer scheduling conflicts. To accomplish this, 
jurisdictions can have analysts consolidate the different roles in the 
testing process.
103
 For instance, the appendix to Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion in Williams demonstrates that in a typical DNA 
testing procedure, one analyst looks for biological materials in the 
sample and while another extracts DNA from the swabbing.
104
 The 
laboratories might be able to consolidate these two positions because 
examination and extraction likely do not require substantially 
disparate expertise and training.
105
 
 
 100. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2728 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 340–44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissenters in those cases were 
the members of the plurality in Williams. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227. 
 101. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion). 
 102. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325 n.10. Defendants may wish to stipulate to the results of 
the test so as to not emphasize its contents through live testimony. Id. at 328. 
 103. One may argue that in some jurisdictions, consolidating positions would be very costly 
because the possible reduction in efficiency may contribute to the backlogs suffered by forensic 
laboratories. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF 
PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC LABORATORIES 4 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/cpffcl09.pdf (“The 411 publicly funded crime labs . . . had a backlog of about 1.2 
million requests [at the end of 2009].”). In those circumstances, it may still be cost-effective to 
outsource any excess work to private laboratories, as was done in Williams. 
 104. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2252–55 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 105. Forensic laboratories often use a “rotation system” in which “each technician performs 
an assigned task for a week (e.g., DNA extraction) and then rotates to a different task the next 
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c.  Measure #2: 
“Notice-and-Demand” Statutes 
Statutory measures constitute another cost-cutting option. The 
Melendez-Diaz majority spoke favorably of “notice-and-demand” 
statutes. These laws require the defendant to raise Confrontation 
Clause challenges in writing within a specified period of time before 
trial, so long as the prosecution has provided written notice that it 
will introduce a forensic laboratory report. If the defendant fails to 
timely raise an objection, this constitutes a waiver.
106
 Such statutes 
should help limit the costs of having analysts and supervisors testify 
because defendants may choose not to object if there is no apparent 
defect in the forensic report or if the defendant would like to stipulate 
to those facts (so as to not emphasize the laboratory’s adverse 
findings through analyst testimony).
107
 
However, the members of the plurality have suggested that 
notice-and-demand statutes are ineffective because defendants have 
an incentive to require the prosecution to call the analysts so as to 
obtain the chance of windfall if the witnesses cannot attend trial (e.g., 
because attendance is too costly).
108
 Nevertheless, this phenomenon 
is unlikely due to the fact that the risk of nonattendance is low. This 
is because the plurality’s cost assumptions are unfounded,
109
 
“[c]ourts are highly deferential to the analysts’ schedules and 
liberally grant continuances to accommodate their conflicts,”
110
 and 
 
week (e.g., DNA amplification).” Brief of Amici Curiae for New York County District Attorney's 
Office and the New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in Support of Respondents 
at 4, Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (No. 10-8505), 2011 WL 5125054, at *6−7 
(italics omitted). The fact that DNA technicians are frequently assigned different tasks in the 
testing process suggests that each of those technicians probably has similar expertise and training. 
 106. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326–27. 
 107. See id. at 326−28. Empirical support for this proposition may be demonstrated by the 
experience of Michigan, which has a “notice-and-demand” statute. MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 600.2167 (2012). The statute may be partially responsible for the fact that the increase in the 
percentage of tests for which analysts provided testimony in the state of Michigan between 2006 
and 2010 (which includes a stretch of time after Melendez-Diaz) was a mere 0.3 percent. See 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2719 n.10 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). The only other 
justice to joint this portion of the opinion was Justice Scalia. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709. 
 108. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 354 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 109. See supra Part IV.B.2.a. 
 110. Brief of Amici Curiae Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, et al., in 
Support of Petitioner at 4, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876), 2010 WL 5043098, at *4. 
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other measures discussed in this Comment reduce the burden on the 
government.
111
 
d.  Measure #3: 
Supervisor with Personal Knowledge 
Allowing the prosecution to call a supervisor with personal 
knowledge instead of all of the analysts who worked on the evidence 
is another way to satisfy Crawford. The approach does not violate 
Crawford’s requirement that the declarant testify because, if the 
supervisor actually observed the testing and wrote the report, his or 
her report would not rely on the statements made by other 
analysts.
112
 Rather, it would simply be the supervisor’s declaration of 
a fact. Cross-examination would be meaningful because the 
supervisor’s report would be the product of his or her own analysis, 
and would reflect his or her own “perception, memory, narration, and 
sincerity.”
113
 Thus, the defendant could adequately test each of these 
qualities of the report on cross-examination.
114
 Furthermore, if a 
testing analyst committed an error or attempted to fabricate the 
results of the test, cross-examining the supervisor could elicit that 
fact because he or she would have observed the whole analysis. 
This measure is also an excellent cost-saving option. In such a 
scenario, the government needs to call only a single analyst, rather 
than endure the costs entailed by calling multiple analysts. Therefore, 
 
 111. Arguably, notice-and-demand statutes also impose costs on criminal defendants by 
causing them to miss out on the opportunity to raise Confrontation Clause objections when 
defense counsel learns something new and important during trial, is overworked, or otherwise 
overlooks an evidentiary issue. Pamela R. Meltzer, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
475, 517 (2006). Even if that is true, the statute may be worth this cost on the defense because the 
proposal’s attempt to safeguard the defense’s right to meaningfully cross-examine witnesses at 
each stage of the testing might be rejected if notice-and-demand statutes were not permitted by 
the proposed rule. 
 112. The supervisor with personal knowledge who watches a tape would not be relying on a 
“testimonial statement” made by the camera because an unedited video has no human declarant. 
Cf. DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 143 (2d ed. 
2008) (“If the goal of the hearsay rule is to require percipient witnesses to be called to testify and 
be subjected to cross-examination rather than allow their observations to be proved through 
hearsay witnesses, nothing would be gained by requiring the in-court testimony of an animal.”). 
 113. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2249 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 114. This conclusion is not contradicted by Bullcoming v. New Mexico, because, unlike the 
testifying surrogate analyst in that case, a supervisor with personal knowledge has “observe[d] the 
test reported in the certification.” 131 S. Ct. at 2710. In fact, Justice Sotomayor expressly left the 
door open for this option when she stated that Bullcoming might have been decided differently 
had “a supervisor who observed an analyst conducting a test testified about the results or a report 
about such results.” Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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this course of action would impose no more of a burden on the 
government than did Melendez-Diaz. 
However, it may not always be feasible for supervisors to be 
physically present when the particular test is conducted. In those 
circumstances, having the supervisor watch a videotape (or like 
medium) of the entire test would be a practicable substitute.
115
 
Moreover, even if the video quality in a particular case is 
somewhat questionable, both the prosecution’s and the defense’s 
interests are accommodated by this measure. The prosecution gets to 
admit the results of the report, while the defense, through cross-
examination, can expose the witness’ perception problems by 
pointing out the inadequacies of the tape that the supervisor relied 
upon. Further, if the testing procedures have been captured on 
videotape, the defense can more easily monitor the testing so as to 
determine whether an analyst committed an error or falsified results. 
The defense can then confront the supervisor with the issues 
discovered on the videotape and diminish the reliability of the report. 
Finally, so long as each test is recorded on tape, the prosecution 
can choose to require a supervisor to watch the tape only when it 
knows that the case is going to trial. Thus, the supervisor need not 
waste his or her time on examining tests for which the prosecution 
does not need to produce a laboratory report at trial. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Justice Kagan correctly observed that “[the five Justices who 
controlled the outcome of Williams] have left significant confusion 
in their wake.”
116
 Part of the cause of this fractured decision is “four 
Justices’ desire to limit Melendez-Diaz . . . in whatever way 
possible.”
117
 However, much of the confusion and dissention could 
be eliminated by this Comment’s proposal. By clarifying the 
government’s constitutional obligations in the context of forensic 
 
 115. Jurisdictions may find the videotape approach to be much cheaper than having all of the 
analysts who worked on the sample testify. Nevertheless, this approach may not be appropriate 
for forensic testing that relies on senses other than sight or hearing. See, e.g., Catherine de Lange, 
Casey Anthony Trial: Is the ‘Smell of Death’ Evidence?, NEWSCIENTIST (May 17, 2011), 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20487-casey-anthony-trial-is-the-smell-of-death-
evidence.html (discussing a forensic test that detects a decomposed body via a “smell test”). In 
those odd cases, the government can still call all of the analysts or a supervisor with personal 
knowledge who was physically present. 
 116. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2277 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
 
 117. Id.
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laboratory reports, the Court would accommodate the cost-related 
concerns of the plurality while holding true to the doctrinal 
underpinnings of Crawford. Doing so would provide much needed 
“guidance to lower court judges and predictability to litigating 
parties.”
118
 
 118. Id.
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